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Abstract—We develop a game-theoretic framework to investi-
gate the effect of cooperation on the energy efficiency in wireless
networks. We address two examples of network architectures,
resembling ad-hoc network and network with central infras-
tructure node. Most present approaches address the issue of
energy efficiency in communication networks by using complex
algorithms to enforce cooperation in the network, followed by
extensive signal processing at the network nodes. Instead, we
address cooperative communication scenarios which are governed
by simple, evolutionary-like, local rules, and do not require
strategic complexity of the network nodes. The approach is
motivated by recent results in evolutionary biology which suggest
that cooperation can emerge in Nature by evolution, i. e. can
be favoured by natural selection, if certain mechanism is at
work. As result, we are able to show by experiments that
cooperative behavior can indeed emerge and persist in wireless
networks, even if the behavior of the individual nodes is driven by
selfish decision making. The results from this work indicate that
uncomplicated local rules, followed by simple fitness evaluation,
can promote cooperation and generate network behavior which
yields global energy efficiency in certain wireless networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dramatic increase in the number of users and growth in
data traffic in the past years pose a significant challenge on all
aspects of current communication networks including capac-
ity, signal processing, complexity, and energy consumption.
Current communication networks will not be able to answer
these demands in near future, which calls for a paradigm
shift in the design of network architectures, communication
strategies and signal processing tools. The provisioning of
energy efficient protocols and communication schemes is one
of the main challenges in the design of present and future
communication networks. The concept of energy efficiency
is particularly relevant to emerging heterogeneous networks
which, besides the ”classical” communication nodes, include
various other devices with low-power capabilities, such as
sensors and other nodes producing machine-type traffic [1].
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Several recent works show that user cooperation is of
fundamental value for increasing both the network throughput
and the energy efficiency. The study of the fundamental
limits of wireless networks suggests that cooperation among
the units can both decrease energy consumption and reduce
interference. In this context, techniques such as cooperative
diversity [2], [3] and interference alignment [4] have been
proposed. Energy efficiency of wireless networks has also been
studied in [5], [6] under the assumption that all nodes are
interested in minimizing the overall energy consumption of
the network. The globally optimal solution, as characterized
by the authors, is achieved when the network nodes establish
cooperation by relaying packets for other users.
Most of the present approaches which deal with the aspects
of cooperative communications, assume that the network nodes
act in a pre-defined way, i. e. their behavior is determined
by (usually) centralized network rules [7]–[11]. This approach
leaves no freedom to the individual nodes to decide about
their involvement in the cooperative act. Since cooperation
is associated with a cost (usually energy) and requires certain
signal processing capabilities (computational complexity), this
approach may lead to a ”cooperation burden” which can be
unreasonably high for some network nodes.
While this ”centralized” approach is reasonable in net-
works with central infrastructure, it is also (somewhat surpris-
ingly) widely adopted in decentralized networks such as ad-
hoc networks. One important group of these efforts focuses
on designing high-level protocols that prevent users from
misbehaving and/or provide incentives for cooperation. To
prevent misbehavior, several protocols based on reputation
propagation have been proposed in the literature, e.g., [7]–
[12]. One general observation is that the proper functioning
of these networks is generally maintained either by enforcing
cooperation, or by keeping track of the cooperative behavior
which demands intensive computation. Other works have used
ideas from micro-economy to construct protocols that reward
cooperation [13]. Overall, these protocols are based on ideas
rooted in game theory, but, in most cases are hard to analyze,
due to the complicated underlying network models.
Another group of recent works analyzes energy efficiency
from a game theoretic perspective, e.g. [14], [15], where at
each time slot, a certain number of nodes are randomly chosen
and assigned to serve as relay nodes on the source-destination
route. In [15], the authors study the Nash equilibrium of packet
forwarding in a static network and derive the equilibrium
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conditions for both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies.
The works in this thrust utilize the repeated game formulation,
where cooperation among users is sustained by punishment for
deviating from the cooperation point. In [16], the authors con-
sider wireless networks consisting of both selfish and altruistic
nodes. They establish the critical role of the altruistic nodes in
encouraging cooperation and elaborate on the sub-optimality
of relaying strategies which ignore the game theoretic aspect.
While we also adopt a game-theoretic framework to study
energy efficiency, our work differs in several important aspects.
First, we do not focus on enforcing cooperation, for example
by keeping track of the cooperative behaviour of the users
and/or using punishment and reward policies. In addition,
we confine our strategies to the physical layer and avoid
introducing elements, like virtual currency, which may add
significant complexity to the higher layers. Finally, we do not
assume presence of altruistic nodes in the network, but rather
assume that all nodes are selfish in the sense that they try to
minimize their individual energy consumption.
The main essence of the work is that we study cooperative
communication scenarios based on simple local rules which
mimic evolutionary principles. The approach is motivated by
recent results in evolutionary biology which suggest that, if
certain mechanism is at work, cooperation can be favored by
natural selection, i. e. even selfish actions of the individual
nodes can lead to emergence of cooperative behavior in the
network. From system point of view, one of the main features
of our approach is that we shift from the well accepted
paradigm of ”engineered” system design, where the system
components have known functions and designers maintain
separation of concerns. Instead, we look at networks such as
biological, social and economic, which evolve over time as a
result of the interactions between the system entities and the
environment. The motivation behind is the remarkable energy
efficiency, information storage and processing capabilities of
living organisms, as compared to present communication sys-
tems. Based on these observations, we address the mechanisms
which lead to the emergence of cooperation in wireless net-
works and discuss the analogies with evolutionary biology.
The results indicate that uncomplicated local rules, followed
by simple fitness evaluation, can generate network behavior
which yields global energy efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we present the relation between energy efficiency and co-
operation and discuss analogies with biological systems. In
Section III we describe the network model and the studied ar-
chitectures. In Section IV we present a game-theoretic frame-
work for the study of energy-efficiency in wireless networks.
The results are presented in Section V. Section VI interprets
the obtained results and discusses possible implications on
systems other than wireless networks. Section VII concludes
the paper and presents directions for future work.
II. COOPERATION IN COMMUNICATION NETWORKS:
RELATIONS WITH BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
A. Biological systems
Cooperation has played a fundamental role in many of the
major transitions in biological evolution and is essential to the
functioning of a large number of biological systems [17]–[20].
Observations show that cooperative interactions are required
for many levels of biological organization ranging from single
cells to groups of animals. Human society, as well, is based
to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation.
Recent results in evolutionary biology suggest that coopera-
tion can emerge and persist in evolving systems, i. e. coopera-
tion can be favored by natural selection, if certain mechanism
is at work [18], [19]. These results may be counter-intuitive
since it is well known that in unstructured populations, natural
selection favors defectors over cooperators, as shown in Fig. 1.
mutation evolution evolution
Fig. 1. Natural selection favours defectors (red) over cooperators (blue), if
no other mechanism is at work; After a random defector is introduced in a
network of cooperators, cooperation vanishes over time. Source: [19].
However, while studying evolutionary games in structured
populations and on graphs, in [18] the authors observe that in
structured populations cooperation may emerge given that a
certain mechanism is at work. The approach of capturing this
effects is evolutionary graph theory, which allows the study of
how spatial structure affects evolutionary dynamics. According
to this model, the individuals of a population are assumed
to be plain cooperators and defectors without any strategic
complexity. The authors show that natural selection can indeed
favor cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided
by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbors, k,
b/c > k. This simple rule is a good approximation for differ-
ent graphs, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular
graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks. In this setting,
the experiments show that cooperators can prevail by forming
network clusters, where they help each other. The resulting
network reciprocity is a generalization of spatial reciprocity
[19]. The intuition behind is that in this case cooperation
can evolve as a consequence of ”social viscosity” even in
the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity. It is
worth mentioning that, besides network reciprocity, there are
several other candidate mechanisms in biology which are able
to explain the emergence and stability of cooperation in certain
biological systems, such as kin selection, direct reciprocity,
indirect reciprocity, and group selection [17], [19]. As we
will elaborate later on, among these candidate mechanisms we
identify network reciprocity as most relevant to our networks
of interest-wireless communication networks.
B. Wireless Networks: Main Features of the Approach
Wireless communication systems have two fundamental
properties. The first one is that the receive power decays
according to a power law function of the distance between the
users, which puts stress on the power consumption; the second
one is the broadcast nature of the wireless communication,
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which leads to interference between the users. With the
increase in the number of subscribers and growth in data traffic
in wireless networks, these two features gain on importance
and have a strong adverse effect on the network performance
in terms of throughput and energy consumption.
The study of the fundamental limits of wireless networks
suggests that cooperation among the units could potentially
overcome these effects. However, one of the main drawbacks
in the performance analysis of general wireless networks is
that it is often based on simplifying assumptions. As an
example, when deriving the performance limits of different
cooperative schemes, the cost of establishing cooperation in
the wireless network is not properly taken into account [21].
As result, in some scenarios, the benefits of cooperation might
be overshadowed by the cost of establishing cooperation in
the first place. As cooperation comes at a cost for the network
users, in a network which lacks centralized control, for some
users it might be beneficial to defect, instead of to cooperate.
Many of the most fundamental instances of cooperation in
biological systems involve simple entities which lack strategic
complexity, which prevents them to adopt strategies that take
into account the history of their interactions with other entities.
Yet, remarkably, cooperation is present in these systems,
as supported by evidence [22]–[24]. Similarly, we will be
interested in designing rules which are simple enough to be
implemented even by network nodes with limited processing
capabilities, yet powerful enough to promote cooperation and
yield energy efficiency, which is in contrast to the approaches
which rely on complex algorithms and reputation tables in
order to enforce cooperation in the network [7], [25], [26].
Essentially, we are interested in cooperation which emerges
as result of the system evolution. The main question we try
to answer is the following: Can cooperation arise in com-
munication networks by evolution? If yes, which mechanism
should be at work? We answer this question in the affirmative,
by showing that cooperation can be promoted by relying on
simple strategies, i.e. by imposing a limited set of rules which
mimic the principles of evolution, and let the systems evolve
in time. It seems that network reciprocity is the candidate
mechanism for promotion of cooperation in some networks.
Indeed, if we describe wireless networks as graphs, an analogy
can be drawn with populations which are not well mixed. The
reason for this is that, given an energy constraint, one user
can interact only with the nodes which are in the range of its
transmission, thus forming a cluster of potential cooperators.
While we build on the legacies of communication protocols
for establishing cooperation in decentralized networks, our
approach differs in one important aspect. Namely, we do not
assume cooperation to be beneficial ”by default”, but we rather
adopt a game-theoretic approach where the network nodes
decide whether to cooperate or not based only on their fitness,
which is a quantity related to the individual energy (power)
consumption. We propose simple, decentralized strategies for
the individual nodes and evaluate their energy efficiency.
Fig. 2 depicts a toy example which describes the mechanism
for promotion of cooperation in wireless networks. The nodes
in the network region of interest calculate their individual
fitness (related to the energy they have on disposal) on a
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(a) Initially, all nodes are de-
fectors (in red). At first, node
B transmits to node C directly.
The energy required for direct
transmission is a polynomial
function of the distance dBC .
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(b) User A is randomly cho-
sen to become cooperator, and
assists B in the transmission.
Since dBA < dBC , B can
save energy by transmitting
only to A.
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(c) Since B observes increase
of its fitness, it becomes co-
operator and helps D in the
transmission to A.
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(d) Finally, node A receives
benefit for its initial coopera-
tive act, as node B provides as-
sistance for the wireless trans-
mission to E.
Fig. 2. Promotion of cooperation in wireless networks with selfish decision-
making of the individual nodes. The mechanism behind can be seen as a form
of network reciprocity, in the spirit of [18].
regular basis and adopt a simple strategy according to which
they change from cooperators to defectors and vice versa.
One example of such strategy is a form of TIT-FOR-TAT,
where a node changes from defector to cooperator when
it experiences benefit (increase of fitness) as result of the
cooperative behavior of other node(s), and vice versa when
there is no such benefit. As we can see, the introduction of
a cooperator in the vicinity of a node involved in wireless
transmission triggers cooperative behavior in that part of the
network, even though the network nodes act in a selfish
manner, i. e. care only about their individual fitness.
III. NETWORK MODEL
A. Assumptions
In order to investigate the emergence of cooperation in
wireless communication networks, we define a network model
which aims at capturing both the essence of wireless commu-
nication networks and the graph models used in evolutionary
game theory. The model is such that it is still rich enough to
capture the essence of the energy consumption in the network
and the mechanism behind the emergence of cooperation, yet
simple enough to be able to interpret the observed phenomena.
We model the network as a graph where the users represent
the nodes and the edges are related to interactions between the
nodes. A time division multiple access (TDMA) approach is
used where the nodes take turns in transmitting their packets
(no frequency reuse). We divide the time scale in time slots
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of equal duration and assume that one transmitter/receiver pair
is activated at random in each time slot. This multiple access
scheme is known to be optimal [5], [6], [27], at least in first
approximation, from a minimum energy per bit perspective.
Although this assumption simplifies the network analysis, it
may be regarded as restrictive, as in reality multiple simulta-
neous transmissions can occur. Nevertheless, we expect that
this simple scenario will be able to capture the essence of the
cooperative behaviour of the users, by performing simulations
over sufficient number of time slots, which averages users
activity over time. We are tempted to conclude that, from
the perspective of the investigated phenomenon (emergence
of cooperation), the simulation results will be a reasonable
indicator of the network behaviour in more general scenarios.
We assume that the nodes are selfish in the sense that their
objective is to be energy (power) efficient, i.e to minimize the
individual energy spent for transmission. As in game theory,
we assume two types of nodes, cooperators and defectors.
The assumption of having transmit packets of equal duration
establishes equivalence between power and energy and both
are used interchangeably throughout the paper.
We address network architectures with either direct (one-
hop) communication (in the case when there is no cooperator
willing to retransmit the packet), or two-hop communication
(one retransmission), in the case of presence of cooperator(s).
This is surely a simplification since, in general, information
can also be transmitted in a multi-hop fashion where informa-
tion is relayed from each source to its destination in successive
transmissions between intermediate nodes 1. Although being
relatively simple, the architectures we address are rich enough
to describe the the network behaviour in the game-theoretic
framework.
B. The role of cooperation
1) Capturing the essence of the network behavior - A
fundamental network unit: Let us look at a network snapshot
which is involved in one transmission (one time slot) between
two nodes, A and B, as depicted in Fig. 3. Let PD be the power
A spends for direct transmission to B. As result of the propa-
gation effects, the received power at B is PR = PD/ (KdαAB),
where α depends on the propagation characteristics of the area
(urban, suburban, rural, etc.) and K is a propagation constant.
Typically, α takes values in the range 2 ≤ α ≤ 4.. We define
the signal-to-noise ratio at the receiver as SNR = PR/σ2,
where σ2 is the noise variance. We say that the transmission
is successful if the receive SNR exceeds a certain threshold
required for reliable reception, SNR ≥ SNR0 = PR0/σ2,
i. e. A should transmit with power PD ≥ KdαABPR0 . We
assume perfect power adaptation and take that node A adjusts
the transmit power to the distance dAB , such that it meets the
receive SNR requirement exactly2.
1The optimality of a certain architecture (from perspective of capacity)
depends on the operating regime of the network (power-limited or interference
limited being two extreme examples). We refer the interested reader to [28]
for the analysis of the capacity-scaling performance of more general network
architectures in different operating regimes.
2This is a simplification since for this adaptation to work, A should know
the network topology (the distance to B) or to have feedback from B about
the receive SNR, in order to adjust the transmit power.
B
A
d
v
C
C1
2
AB
Fig. 3. Typical communication scenario: yellow circle - transmitter ;
green circle - receiver; blue circles - cooperators; red circles - nodes that
do not participate in the communication; dashed line - the area where
intermediate nodes are located; full line - the area where the cooperators
for the transmission/receiver pair A/B are located;
We say that a node C is in range of A, or connected to
A, if it can ”hear” A’s transmission to B. Under the assumed
power adaptation, a node C is in the range of A if dAC ≤ dAB .
Additionally, we assume that C is a potential cooperator only if
dCB ≤ dAB . This assumption is reasonable, since otherwise
the cost of retransmission would be higher than the cost of
direct transmission 3. According to the scenario we address,
the region containing potential cooperators is described by
dAC < dAB ; dCB < dAB . (1)
A node C which fulfills (1) is called intermediate node.As
depicted in Fig. 3, potential cooperators are located in the
area enclosed with a dashed line. This constellation represents
a typical scenario which captures the essence of the communi-
cation in the network and can be thus regarded as fundamental
network unit. If an intermediate node C decides to help A in
the transmission, it will retransmit the signal received from A
to B. The benefit that the node A obtains from the cooperative
act of C is that, in the presence of the cooperator C, A can
decrease the transmit power to a value lower then the power
required for direct transmission, PI ≤ PD, which defines the
benefit of the cooperative act as b = PD − PI .
In general, for a given transmitter/receiver pair A/B there
can be more then one cooperator. In this case they can either
share the cost for cooperation or let one cooperator pay the
overall cost. For simplicity, we only address the case where
only the closest cooperator to B retransmits the signal and
leave different approaches to cost sharing for future study. At
first sight, this simplification might seem suboptimal, since in
this way in one time instant the cost of cooperation is paid by
a single cooperator. However, this effect will be averaged over
time since for different transmitter/receiver pairs, the choice
will fall on different cooperators (with high probability).
2) Protocols for establishing cooperation: In order for
cooperation to work, the involved nodes should exchange
some kind of control messages, i. e. they need to establish
a cooperation protocol. We hereby identify two protocol
3In general, one could allow for a cooperator C to be found at a distance
dCB ≥ dAB . In this case cooperation might still be beneficial, if the cost of
cooperation is shared between several cooperators. This assumption could
influence the network behaviour, particularly in the case of the network
architecture with a central infrastructure node, addressed in Section V.
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scenarios. For both protocols, we implicitly assume that the
nodes have the amount of knowledge of the network topology
required for both protocols to work.
Cooperation protocol 1: This cooperation protocol as-
sumes that user A sends a low-rate request to relay message
within a region of radius ν · dAB , where 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1. The
parameter ν has the role to further reduce the range of A’s
transmission. With this convention, instead of engaging all
cooperators from the area defined with (1) in the retransmis-
sions, we account only for those located in the area enclosed
by the full line in Fig. 3. By introducing the parameter ν, one
avoids sending request to relay messages at large distances.
Additionally, it is expected that the cooperative act is most
beneficial for the transmitter A when the potential cooperators
are found (relatively) near to the transmitter, since this lowers
the cost of direct transmission. Although this choice could
potentially increase the total cost of cooperation, this will not
affect significantly the cost that individual cooperators pay.
Indeed, the total cost of cooperation is distributed between the
cooperators in the region of interest, either directly (by having
more cooperators assisting a single transmitter), or indirectly
(by choosing different cooperators over time).
Having received the request to relay message (which besides
the sender A, also identifies the destination B), cooperator
nodes located in this region will send back an acknowledge-
ment to A that they accept to relay (retransmit). If more than
one cooperator is present, A decides which of the cooperator(s)
will actually retransmit. The subtle characteristics of this
protocol is that node A can be selfish in the decision process
in the sense that it can choose only one cooperator-the nearest
one, in order to minimize its own transmit power. In that case,
in the final phase of the transmission node A will transmit
a signal with power adopted to the distance of the nearest
cooperator, which will then retransmit the message. We note
that this behaviour increases the cost of cooperation and is
also suboptimal from the point of view of the total energy
consumption of the network.
Cooperation protocol 2: In the first phase of this co-
operation protocol user A also transmits a request to relay
message in the region of radius ν · dAB . In the second phase,
the cooperators coordinate among themselves and one of the
cooperators sends node A a general confirmation that there are
cooperators present in this region (without disclosing their
identity). In the case of no response, A assumes that there
are no cooperators. If there is a confirmation of cooperators
present, in the next phase A will transmit the message with
reduced power PI = ναPD. Having received the signal
from A, it is now on the cooperators to decide which one(s)
will retransmit the message. This can be done by a form of
coordination between the cooperators4. If one cooperator is
chosen to retransmit the message, the natural choice falls on
the one which is closest to the destination B. The difference
with the first protocol is that now the coordination is performed
among ”trusted nodes”, i. e. cooperators. While in the first
4One such form of coordination is quorum sensing which refers to the
phenomenon in which the accumulation of signalling molecules in the
surrounding environment enables a single cell to assess the cell density so
that the population as a whole can make a coordinated response.
protocol the transmit node A (which can be a defector in
general) dictates the cooperation, in the second one it is the
cooperators who decide on the details of the cooperative act5.
In the scenarios we address, we adopt the second cooper-
ation protocol, as we expect that it would favor cooperative
behavior. The motivation behind is that the adoption of the first
cooperation protocol would encourage the transmitter node to
save energy by transmitting only to the nearest of the potential
cooperators, which would eventually undermine the efforts of
the cooperative nodes and discourage spreading of cooperative
behavior in the networks6. On the other hand, the second
protocol leaves less room to the transmitter nodes (which
are in general not trustworthy) to misbehave, and allows for
arrangements among the trustworthy, cooperative nodes.
IV. A GAME-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ENERGY-EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
Game-theoretic approach to modelling of phenomena as-
sumes existence of some quantity – utility, or benefit – that
units in the system try to maximize [29]. In some scenarios
the agents may choose to help the others, i.e. to cooperate –
this is modeled by the cost they pay for the cooperation. Some
agents choose their strategy to be selfish, i.e. they defect, and
thus avoid any costs. The cost of cooperative act implies that
the cooperators would have smaller fitness than the defectors,
i. e. that natural selection of the fittest would favors defectors.
However, recent results in evolutionary biology suggest that
cooperation can be favored by natural selection, if a certain
mechanism is at work. Indeed, there are observations and
theoretic analyzes of cases when cooperation persists – there
is at least a fraction of cooperators present in the population.
A. Definition of Fitness in Wireless Networks
Following the analogy with evolutionary biology, we will
define fitness of the individual network nodes. Intuitively,
the fitness has to be related with the energy consumption of
the individual nodes. Ideally, the appropriate fitness function
has to be simple enough to be evaluated locally (possibly
without requiring complex processing and memory). On the
other hand, it has to be rich enough to capture the essence of
wireless transmission and network dynamics. We will define
two discrete time scales, according to which the fitness will
be evaluated. The fitness function is evaluated at the end
of a block of duration T slots. The network performance
is observed over N such blocks (iterations). Since we have
two time scales, we introduce two indices, t and n, where
t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} indicates the time slot and n ∈ {0, . . . , N}
indicates the iteration. The fitness is then a function of n and
t, F = F (n, t). We note that, in order to be consistent with
the definition of t, we denote the initial iteration (of duration
T ) as 0-th iteration. Additionally, we denote the initial fitness
as F (0, 0) = F0. Now, let us define
∆f(n, t) = F (n, t)− F (n, t− 1), t = 1, . . . , T, (2)
5Similar behavior has been observed while studying structured populations
[18]. In these populations, once introduced by chance, cooperation persists by
the formation of clusters of cooperators which help each other.
6This conjecture has yet to be supported by simulations.
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which measures the difference in the fitness evaluated at two
consecutive time instants t− 1 and t, of the n-th iteration. In
our model, ∆f(n, t) for the network node C is defined as
∆f(n, t) = −α (1− β) [PD − PI ]− γδPC(J) (3)
where α, β, γ, δ ∈ {0, 1} are parameters which indicate packet
transmission and presence of cooperators and defectors. In
particular, α = 1 when C has a packet to transmit; β = 1
when C has at least one cooperator as a neighbor; γ = 1 when
C is connected to at least one active node at that time instant;
and δ = 1 corresponds to C being a cooperator (otherwise the
parameter values are zeros). We note that the above parameters
are also functions of n and t. However, whenever there is no
ambiguity, and in order to simplify the notation, we will skip
these indices. Having introduced ∆f(n, t), we can define the
fitness of the node C in the following way
F (0, 0) = F0,
F (n, t) = F (n, t− 1) + ∆f(n, t),
F (n+ 1, 0) = F (n, T ) (4)
where n = 0, 1, . . . , N−1 and t = 0, 1, . . . , T . Defined in this
way, the fitness reflects both the energy saving of the individual
nodes when their transmissions are assisted by cooperators,
e. g. the benefit they receive, and their energy expenditure
when they assist other nodes in the transmission, i. e. the cost
they pay for cooperation. Additionally, we define the quantity
∆F (n) = F (n, T )− F (n− 1, T ), n = 1, . . . , N (5)
to be the change of fitness between two consecutive iterations.
B. Game-theoretic Strategies
In this work we study four different strategies of cooperative
behavior in wireless networks. In the present approach we as-
sume that all network nodes adopt the same strategy during the
simulations. This approach certainly does not cover some more
general scenarios, for example the one when the individual
nodes are able to choose their strategy at random, or according
to some rule. Nevertheless, we expect that the results from our
analysis will fairly well indicate the general trend and, as such,
will be useful in the evaluation of the fundamental limits on
energy efficiency in decentralized networks.
The first strategy addresses the trivial case when there is no
cooperation between the nodes, i. e. all nodes are defectors.
We denote this strategy by DEF. The second strategy addresses
the case where all nodes cooperate and will be denoted as
COOP. It corresponds to a scenario where cooperation is ”
enforced” in the network. Besides these ”trivial” cases, we
will concentrate on be strategies which where the individual
nodes are essentially selfish and decide whether to cooperate
or not based solely on their individual fitness. In the scenario
that we propose, at the end of the n-th iteration the network
nodes make a simple decision whether to cooperate or defect in
the next iteration, based on the change in the fitness ∆F (n) =
F (n, T )− F (n− 1, T ), as defined in (5).
We will distinguish between two simple and intuitive strate-
gies for this scenario. According to the first one, if the node
observes an increase in the fitness, ∆F (n) > 0, it will retain
the previous status in the next iteration. If, on the other
hand, the node observes decrease in the fitness ∆F (n) < 0,
the node will change its behavior, i. e. a cooperator will
become a defector and vice versa. We observe that from the
perspective of a single node, the game resembles the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma [17]. In this regard, the above described
strategy corresponds to the well known win-stay, lose-shift
(WSLS) and is based on the simple idea of retaining the
previous status when the node is doing well, but changing
otherwise. According to the other strategy for this scenario,
the node will decide to cooperate in the next iteration if it
observes an increase in the fitness, ∆F (n) > 0. Otherwise,
it will defect. According to this strategy, a defector will
become cooperator and a cooperator will stay cooperator, if
∆F (n) > 0. Otherwise, the node will choose to defect. We
note that the increase in fitness reflects the average behavior of
the adjacent nodes, in the sense that the reason for the fitness
increase is the cooperative behavior of some of the adjacent
nodes. In the context of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma,
this strategy resembles the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy which is
based on the idea of mimicking the other node(s) behavior
in the previous turn. This means that the node will become
cooperator only if it observes cooperative behavior of other
nodes which is reflected in the increase in the fitness.
V. EXAMPLES OF NETWORK ARCHITECTURES:
DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENTS
A. Network Architectures
We investigate the cooperative behavior in two wireless
network architectures, wireless ad hoc network and network
with a central infrastructure node. A graphical representation
for the two network architectures is given in Fig. 4.
Wireless ad hoc network: A wireless ad hoc network
represents a collection of wireless nodes that self-configure to
form a network without the aid of any established infrastruc-
ture. Immediate applications of ad hoc networks include emer-
gency and battlefield networks, metropolitan mesh networks
for broadband Internet access, and sensor networks. In addition
to these pending applications, ad hoc networks are closely
related to the science of networks in other fields, including
biology, economics, and air and automobile transportation.
Network with central infrastructure node: The second
architecture we address is asymmetric and assumes that the
users in one area (circle for example) transmit their signals
to a central infrastructure node, e. g. access point, relay,
or base station. This architecture is particularly relevant in
the context of the emerging trends in the design of future
wireless networks, which rely on dense and heterogeneous
deployment of the wireless network infrastructure. Dense
deployment means pairing traditional macrocells with pico
or femtocells in densely populated urban environments; het-
erogeneous deployment means combining the current cellular
network infrastructure with a parallel offloading infrastructure,
based on multiple radio-access technologies (such as GSM,
UMTS, WiFi, and device-to-device communication) [30]. The
simulation set up for both network architectures is as follows.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Network architectures where cooperative behavior is considered: a)
wireless ad hoc network; b) network with central infrastructure node.
We place M wireless nodes uniformly at random in a circle of
unit radius r (we are interested only in the relative performance
of the different strategies and not in the absolute value of the
consumed energy). The nodes send their messages during time
slots of fixed duration (same for all nodes), where in each
time slot exactly one transmitter/receiver pair is activated at
random. We group the time slots in a block of length T , which
denotes one iteration. The network behaviour is observed over
N iterations. Additionally, Nt different network configurations
are tested. The parameters selected for our simulations are:
M = 30, α = 4, T = 1000, N = 1000 and Nt = 1000.
Assuming the aforementioned strategies for the behavior of
the individual users, the aim of the analysis/simulations will
be to investigate the cooperative behaviour in the network and
to evaluate the performance of the different strategies in terms
of individual and global energy consumption, for both network
architectures. As we will see, although both architectures share
certain similarities, the adoption of the same game-theoretic
strategy may yield qualitatively different network behavior.
While simulating the performance of TFT and WSLS, we
will assume that in the initial iteration all users are defectors.
At the end of the initial iteration we choose one user at random
to become cooperator. According to the change of the fitness
defined in (5), the users determine their behaviour during the
next iteration (cooperate or defect) according to the TFT or
the WSLS strategy. The performance will be compared with
COOP (all cooperators) and DEF (all defectors), which serve
as upper respectively lower bound for the performance.
B. Simulations: Wireless ad hoc network
In this set up we assume peer-to-peer communication where
each transmitter/receiver pair is equally likely.
1) Cooperative behaviour: In the case of TFT and WSLS,
simulation results indicate that, once a single cooperator is in-
troduced in the network (by chance), the network evolves such
that cooperation spreads through the network, even though the
decision making of the individual nodes is based on a (rather
simple) evaluation of the individual fitness. Fig. 5 depicts the
effect of spreading of cooperation over time. In addition, the
simulation results show that the emergence and stability of
cooperation is fairly robust to the random placement of the
initial cooperator. This, as we believe, is mainly due to the
assumption that each transmitter/receiver pair is equally likely,
which brings symmetry to the problem. We note that the effect
of spreading of cooperation, in general, also depends on the
activity of the users and the duration (length) of one iteration.
We recall that in our scenario we assume that in each time slot
(at least) one transmission takes place in the network, and that
one iteration involves a long number of time slots. This means
that during the first iteration there will almost certainly exist
network node(s) which will benefit from the cooperative act
of the initial cooperator, which is exactly the prerequisite for
cooperation to spread in the network. If this is not the case,
cooperation is expected to vanish in the next iteration.
Fig. 5. Emergence of cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks. Red
circles–defectors; blue circles–cooperators. After the introduction of a single
cooperator, cooperative behavior spreads in the network and persists over time.
2) Energy consumption: Before proceeding, we first eval-
uate the influence of the choice of the parameter ν, defined
in Section III. The simulations show that the value of ν for
which the total energy consumption is minimal varies slightly
with the choice of strategy, but can be located close to 0.39.
This value is used in the rest of the simulations.
When the users adopt the DEF strategy, a transmitter A
communicates with a receiver B by direct transmission. In
the case when the users adopt the COOP strategy, for a
transmitter/receiver pair A/B, user A receives benefit from the
cooperators located in the area defined by (1), reflected in the
fact that it can decrease the transmit power. The simulations
show that when all nodes cooperate the total (average) energy
consumption is reduced by 60% as opposed to the case when
all nodes defect, as indicated in Table I, which illustrates the
standard deviation of the individual energy consumption as
function of the network geography (distance from the center).
TABLE I
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE ENERGY E
strategy mean(E) std(E)
DEF 1.00000 0.72150
COOP 0.39755 0.13093
TFT 0.48858 0.11559
WSLS 0.60966 0.01671
Apart from the reduction in average energy consumption,
cooperation leads to a more-fair energy consumption among
the individual nodes. Indeed, when there is no cooperation
the nodes which are located further from the center are at a
disadvantage as the average distance to the rest of the nodes is
larger compared to the nodes which are located near the center,
leading to increased energy consumption for transmission. The
introduction of cooperation lessens this imbalance to some
extent. An illustration of this effect is shown in Fig. 6. As we
can see, the introduction of cooperation balances the amount of
energy spent by the individual nodes, and decreases the effect
of the network topology on the individual energy consumption.
While simulating the performance of the TFT and WSLS
strategy, we start by assuming that in the initial iteration
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Fig. 6. Individual energy consumption depending on the location.
all users are defectors. At the end of the initial iteration
we choose one user at random to become a cooperator.
The simulation results show that COOP yields a minimal
total energy consumption among all four strategies (which is
expected), followed by TFT, as shown in Table I.
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Fig. 7. Individual energy consumption with COOP, TFT and WSLS.
However, the results also indicate that the COOP might not
be the optimal strategy from the perspective of the energy
consumption of the individual nodes, as Fig. 6 and Fig. 7
indicate. For example, when the network nodes follow the
WSLS strategy, the nodes closer to the center are characterized
by lower individual energy consumption compared to the
other strategies. Further, the WSLS strategy yields a more
balanced energy consumption as function of the geographical
distribution of the nodes, as presented in Table I.
C. Simulations: Network with Central Infrastructure Node
The second network architecture we address corresponds
to a cellular (infrastructure) scenario as it assumes that the
users located in one area transmit their signals to a central
infrastructure node, e. g. access point, relay, or base station.
1) Cooperative behaviour: Due to the specific network ge-
ometry (central infrastructure node which receives all packets),
the mechanism of spreading of cooperation in this network
shows significant difference with the wireless ad hoc network.
To see why this is the case, let us take that a cooperator
is placed at distance r0 from the center. Due to the specific
network configuration, only nodes which are at distance r > r0
(i. e. further away from the center) can benefit from the cooper-
ative act. As result, only these nodes can change their behavior
from defectors to cooperators. In other words, spreading of
cooperation is sensitive to the location of the initial cooperator.
This is a major difference from the previous case, where no
such constraint has been observed.
This observation has the implication that, in order to
quantify correctly the effect of cooperation on the energy
consumption in the network, one has to average over all
different placements of the initial cooperator. Fig. 8 depicts
the total energy consumption for the TFT strategy7(averaged
over the number of nodes), presented as a function of the
location of the initial cooperator. We observe that the overall
energy consumption is minimal when the initial cooperator
is approximately at distance r0 = 0.26 from the center. This
behavior is somewhat surprising, since one would expect that
the most beneficial set up is when the initial cooperator is
located as close as possible to the center.
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Fig. 8. Total energy consumed with TFT depending on the location of the
initial cooperator
2) Energy consumption: As result of the network configura-
tion, the behaviour of the TFT and the WSLS strategy in this
network architecture shows significant difference. The most
important observation is that when the nodes adopt the WSLS
strategy, cooperation does not persist in the network on long
term. Namely, after the introduction of the initial cooperator,
the cooperation behavior spreads in the network, but fades out
over a finite number of iterations. In the case when the nodes
adopt the TFT strategy, on the other hand, simulation results
show that cooperation persists over time (although the region
where cooperators are found) depends on the placement of
the initial cooperator. The TFT strategy also yields a fairly
low total energy consumption in the network (second best,
right after the COOP strategy), as shown in Table II.
Additionally, it can be observed that WSLS and DEF have
almost identical energy consumption. This is expected, since
after the initial cooperation frenzy, the number of defectors
gradually increases leading to extinction of cooperation. The
individual energy consumption as function of the distance from
the center, when different strategies are applied, is displayed
in Fig. 9. When the nodes act accordingly to the WSLS
7Since the cooperative behaviour vanishes in the case of the WSLS strategy,
only the result for the TFT strategy is illustrated.
8The total energy consumption depends on the location of the individual
cooperator. The values in the table are shown for cooperator locations which
lead to the minimal possible energy consumption.
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TABLE II
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE ENERGY E IN THE CELLULAR
SCENARIO
strategy mean(E) std(E)
DEF 1.00000 1.34555
COOP 0.29348 0.78187
MINIMAL 0.11021 0.92291
TFT8 0.46329 0.81327
WSLS 0.99534 1.33419
strategy, the energy consumption increases polynomially with
the distance, due to the extinction of cooperation. The energy
consumption with TFT increases gradually up to 0.8 distance
units from the center, and decreases for the nodes over this
point. We can conclude that TFT leads to a reduction in the
individual energy consumption for all nodes when compared
to DEF. This is different from the COOP strategy where some
nodes (for example those at distance 0.4) spend more energy
as cooperators as opposed to when they are defectors.
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Fig. 9. Individual energy as function of the distance from the center
D. A special case: dense homogeneous network with central
infrastructure node and full cooperation
This case addresses the scenario where the network is dense
enough so that at least one cooperator is present in every (suf-
ficiently small) area. This assumption is not only convenient
as it simplifies the analysis, but is also realistic to some extent
since it covers the case of large networks spreading over a
region of fixed area. Additionally, we consider that all nodes
are cooperators. Hence, the performance of the system in this
setting can be seen as the ultimate performance bound for any
strategy (or a set of mixed strategies) in terms of the total
energy consumption in the network.
In a typical communication scenario, node A (located at
distance x from the center) transmits to the central node B
with the help of a cooperator C (located at distance y < x
from B). The high-density assumption allows to assume that
the node C lies on the line AB, or at least very close to it (see
Fig. 10). In order to distribute the cost of cooperation, we
assume that A can choose among all cooperators between it
and B (which are close to the line AB), with some probability.
Let the probability density function for choosing (targeting)
the cooperator at distance y, when the sender is at distance
x, be P (x, y). The average transmission energy for a node at
B
A
C
Fig. 10. Example of the communication in a cellular network
distance r from the central node thus reads
ET (r) = K
∫ r
0
P (r, y)(r − y)αdy, (6)
where K is a normalization constant which accounts for all
propagation factors, apart from the signal path loss.
The density P (x, y) corresponds to all pairs transmitter-
cooperator which are located in some infinitesimal regions
(see Fig. 10), where the area of such infinitesimal region is
proportional to its distance from the central node. We assume
that the retransmissions of messages originating from the in-
finitesimal area around A are shared equally by the cooperators
from the infinitesimal area around C (we consider only the
messages targeting the cooperators in this area according to
the probability distribution). From the proportionality of the
areas, it follows that the average number of messages (per
node) to be retransmitted by a cooperator C at distance y from
the central node, and originating from a sender A at distance x,
is larger for a factor x/y than the average number of generated
messages (targeting at C’s neighbourhood). Hence, the average
energy spent for cooperation of a node at distance r from the
central node reads
EC(r) = K
∫ R
r
P (x, r)rα
x
r
dx. (7)
The average energy consumed by a node at distance r from
the central node (including both the energy for transmission
of own messages and the energy for cooperation) is given by
E(r) = K
∫ r
0
P (r, y)(r−y)αdy+K
∫ R
r
P (x, r)rα
x
r
dx. (8)
By using (8), one can calculate the total energy consumption
in the network as
Etotal = K
∫ R
0
dx
∫ x
0
P (x, y)Q(x, y)dy, (9)
where
Q(x, y) = (x− y)α + yα−1x. (10)
Ideally, the optimal choice of the distribution P (x, y) would
minimize the total energy consumption and balance the in-
dividual energy consumption simultaneously. However, since
both requirements might be contradictory, we first address each
issue separately.
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Minimizing the total energy consumption: Here we derive
the distribution of P (x, y) which minimizes Etotal, and also
present the resulting minimal energy.
Lemma 1: The distribution P (x, y) which minimizes Etotal
is given by
P (x, y) = δ (y − y(q(x))) , (11)
where Qmin(x, y)
.
= q(x) denotes the minimal value of Q for
fixed x – the minimization is done by varying y, and δ(·) is
the Dirac δ function.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Having the optimal P (x, y), the minimal total energy reads
Emin = K
∫ R
0
dx
∫ x
0
δ (y − y(q(x)))Q(x, y)dy
= K
∫ R
0
q(x)dx. (12)
Clearly, the last integral depends on α, since q(x) depends
on α, q(x) = qα(x). Singularity of distributions implies that
the transmitters from the ring with radius x should send their
messages to their peers at the ring with radius y(q(x)). We
denote the cooperation strategy associated strategy with the
minimal total energy consumption as MINIMAL. The total
energy consumption of this strategy is illustrated in Table II.
Balancing the individual energy consumption: While the
distribution (12) minimizes the total energy consumption in the
network, it is not the optimal solution when it comes to the
energy consumption of the individual nodes. Indeed, as Fig. 9
shows, the individual energy consumption depends on the node
location. For example, nodes at distance 0.5 (approximately)
from the center consume more energy than other nodes. Perfect
balancing would require that the distribution P (x, y) is such
that the individual energy consumption is independent on the
distance r
E(r) = K
∫ r
0
P (r, y)(r − y)αdy +K
∫ R
r
P (x, r)rα
x
r
dx
= const. (13)
Analytical solution of (13) (if it exists at all), seems to be out
of reach. In order to simplify the analysis, one can relax the
demand for equal energy spending and search for a solution
with as balanced as possible individual consumption. This
means finding the coordination pattern among the nodes which
leads to smallest possible variation of the consumed energy. To
make the problem more tractable one can divide the circle into
N rings of width r, such that R = Nr. This discretization of
the problem would allow for deployment of some optimization
techniques. The directions for solving the problem in the
discrete case are presented in Appendix B.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Interpretation of the results
The results clearly indicate that cooperation can spread in
wireless networks, even in networks with selfish nodes which
adopt simple strategies and update their behavior only based
on the individual fitness. In addition, there are several other
important conclusions, which arise as result of the analysis.
Spreading and persistence of cooperation is affected
by network architecture: In the ad-hoc network setup the
adoption of the WSLS strategy results in spreading of the co-
operative behavior in the network. Cooperation remains stable
over time, resulting in decreased energy consumption. In the
network with a central infrastructure node, on the other hand,
the adoption of the WSLS strategy does not favor cooperation
on long run-after the initial spread, cooperation fades out with
time. The cooperative behavior in the network where the nodes
adopt the TFT strategy, on the other hand, seems to be more
robust to different network topologies, as it persists over time
in both network setups. There is additional difference between
the network architectures, since the spreading of cooperation
shows to be sensitive to the location of the initial cooperator
in the network with central infrastructure node, in contrast to
the ad-hoc network setup.
Cooperation has positive effect on the total energy con-
sumption in the network: When cooperation persists, both
TFT and WSLS yield significant decrease in the energy
consumption compared to the case without cooperation (DEF
strategy). The performance is, as expected upper-bounded by
the performance of the COOP strategy. However, the COOP
strategy requires mechanisms to enforce cooperation in order
to ensure that all nodes cooperate, which are particularly dif-
ficult to implement in decentralized, heterogeneous networks.
Different strategies balance the individual energy spend-
ing in a different way: While cooperation has positive ef-
fect on the average energy consumption, the individual en-
ergy consumption depends on the location of the individual
nodes. Moreover, different strategies balance the total energy
spending over the individual nodes in a different way. For
example, in the case of the ad-hoc network, the WSLS strategy
yields lower energy consumption then TFT and COOP for
the nodes near the center. Additionally, while WSLS yields
higher total energy consumption compared to TFT and COOP,
the consumption of the individual nodes is approximately
constant over different locations (distances from the center).
This behavior of WSLS could be particularly relevant in the
setup where the network nodes have finite energy capacity
(finite buffer). In the network with a central infrastructure
node, the COOP strategy seems to increase the cooperative
burden for the nodes located in the middle between the central
node and the peripheral nodes, while the TFT strategy seems
to share the cost of cooperation more equally among the
cooperative nodes, as indicated by the simulation results.
B. Relevance to systems other than communication networks
Although this work addresses energy efficiency in wireless
communication systems, it is possible that the results have
implications on the understanding of certain biological and
social phenomena. We recall that the main feature of wireless
networks which justifies cooperative behaviour is the fact that
the cost of communication (transmission) is a function which
is polynomial in the distance. However, similar functions
(although not always well understood) may be objects to
optimization in biological systems as well. As an example we
can take the neural system, where neurons differentiate from
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multipotent stem cells and migrate to their final residence in
the system. When these neurons reach their residence, they ex-
tend an axon which needs to travel a certain distance to attach
to other neurons (forming a synapse) and enable inter-neuronal
communication. Since axons may travel long distances, axonal
trajectories appear to be broken up into a series of smaller
movements, where the axon finds intermediate targets that
act as choice points (also called guidepost cells) [31]. This
behaviour has clear analogy in the relaying (retransmissions)
addressed in the wireless network scenario. In this particular
example, the insights gained from the analysis of wireless
networks where the behaviour of the nodes is determined by
evolutionary-like rules, could be applied to access the benefits
and costs associated with growing axons directly to the target,
and using intermediate targets, i. e. guidepost cells.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We investigated the mechanisms for promotion of cooper-
ation in decentralized wireless networks. The approach was
motivated by recent results in evolutionary biology which
suggest that cooperation can be favoured by natural selection,
if a certain mechanism is at work. We modelled the wireless
network as a graph, where benefits and costs were associated
with the strategy that the network users follow. In game-
theoretic spirit, the nodes based their behavior on calculations
of their energy spending. We presented numerical study of
cooperative communication scenarios based on simple local
rules, which is in contrast to most of the approaches in
the literature which enforce cooperation by using complex
algorithms and require strategic complexity of the network
nodes. The simulations show that even selfish decision making
(such as one based on TFT or WSLS strategy) of the nodes can
lead to emergence of cooperation. These observations serve as
indicator that uncomplicated local rules, followed by simple
fitness evaluation, can generate network behavior which yields
global energy efficiency. We identify several major directions
for future work, as formulated in the following.
Individual strategy selection: We recall that in this work
we adopted the convention that the same strategy was used
by all users in all iterations. In a future version of the
work, we will consider the case where each of the individual
users is allowed to choose its own strategy at every iteration.
As discussed, the results from the simulations indicate that,
depending on the node distance from the center, distinct
nodes could find optimal to follow different strategies. It is
expected that this analysis will bring valuable insights in the
dependencies between the choice of optimal strategy for the
individual users and the network topology.
Nodes with finite energy buffers, energy harvesting:
In addition, it will be interesting to evaluate the network
behaviour in the case when the nodes have buffers with limited
energy capacity, under a particular random arrival process.
This is in contrast to the here addressed scenario which
assumes nodes with infinite-length buffers. We expect that
the adoption of this more realistic assumption will influence
both the behaviour of the individual nodes and the way
energy is consumed in the network. Additionally, it is expected
that will yield qualitatively different performance of the here
addresses strategies, as indicated in Section VI. This more
general approach also includes the energy harvesting scenario
where the nodes harvest energy quanta from the environment
according to some arrival process.
Implication on other systems: While this work was
motivated by observations in biological systems and social
systems, it is possible that the results have implications on
the understanding of certain biological and social phenomena.
This would establish a connection in the other direction, where
lessons from artificial systems (such as wireless communica-
tion networks) can be applied to natural systems.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since the function Q(x, y) is non-negative, the following
inequality holds∫ R
0
dx
∫ x
0
P (x, y)Q(x, y)dy ≥
∫ R
0
dx
∫ x
0
P (x, y)q(x)dy,
(14)
where q(x) .= Qmin(x, y) denotes the minimal value of Q for
fixed x – the minimization is done by varying y. The right
hand side of the last inequality then simplifies∫ R
0
dx
∫ x
0
P (x, y)q(x)dy =
∫ R
0
q(x)dx, (15)
due to the normalization of the distribution,∫ ∫
P (x, y)dxdy = 1. The equality in (14) will hold
only if one chooses a singular distribution
P (x, y) = δ (y − y(q(x))) , (16)
located at the point y(q(x)) which corresponds to the mini-
mum of the function Q(x, y) for fixed x.
APPENDIX B
BALANCING THE INDIVIDUAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION:
DISCRETE APPROXIMATION
When the number of rings N is large, for the purpose of
energy calculation, one can assume that the nodes are located
in the middle of the rings. Furthermore, we assume that every
node sends its message with some probability to some peer
in some inner ring, or with some probability directly to the
relay. For the node in the ring i the set of those probabilities
is pi,j , where j = 0, 1, ...i− 1, and pi,0 is the probability for
sending the message to the relay. The energy for transmission
for that node will be
Et(i) =
i−1∑
j=0
pi,j [r(i− j)]α = rα
i−1∑
j=0
pi,j(i− j)α. (17)
On the other hand, the cooperation will consume energy
Ec(i) =
N∑
k=i+1
pk,i(ir)
α k
i
= rα
N∑
k=i+1
pk,ii
α k
i
, (18)
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where the factor k/i appears for the same reason as in (7).
Total energy thus consists of two sums
E(i) = rα
i−1∑
j=0
pi,j(i− j)α +
N∑
k=i+1
pk,ii
α k
i
 . (19)
The last expression could be written more neatly as
E(i) = rα
N∑
j=0
(βi,jpi,j + γj,ipj,i), (20)
where the non-zero coefficients are βi,j = (i − j)α for j =
0, 1, ..., i− 1 and γj,i = jiα−1 for j = i+ 1, i+ 2, ..., N . This
means that for particular i and j only one of βi,j and γj,i is
non-zero. The average energy is
〈E〉 = r
α
N
N∑
i=1
E(i) = r
α
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=0
(βi,jpi,j + γj,ipj,i)
=
rα
N
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=0
δi,jpi,j , (21)
where δi,j = βi,j + γj,i. As a measure of the balance is the
mean squared deviation
σ2 = 〈(E − 〈E〉)2〉 = 1
N
N∑
j=1
[E(i)− 〈E〉]2. (22)
Since the optimal parameters pi,j are probabilities, the nor-
malization puts a constraint
N∑
j=0
pi,j =
i−1∑
j=0
pi,j = 1. (23)
Hence, in the discrete case, if one searches for a solution which
balances the individual energy consumption in the network,
one should minimize (22), subject to the constraint (23).This
can be performed, for example, by using certain modeling
systems for convex optimization.
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